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A principal wants two sequential tasks to be performed by wealth-constrained agents.
Suppose that there is an outcome externality; i.e., a ﬁrst-stage success can make second-
stage effort more or less effective. If the tasks are conﬂicting, the principal’s proﬁt-
maximizing way to induce high efforts is to hire one agent to perform both tasks (so that
the prospect to get a larger second-stage rent after a ﬁrst-stage success motivates the
agent to work hard in the ﬁrst stage). In contrast, when there is an effort externality (i.e.,
ﬁrst-stage effort reduces or increases the probability of a second-stage success), then the
principal prefers to hire two agents whenever the tasks are conﬂicting.
& 2012 Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license. 1. Introduction
Decision-makers often have to choose between letting one agent be responsible for two tasks, or letting two different
agents be responsible for one task each. For example, when an infrastructure facility is built (ﬁrst task) and subsequently
operated (second task), it has to be decided whether the same contractor or two different contractors should be in charge
of the two tasks.1 When a new government is formed, there can be a single department responsible for different ﬁelds, or
there can be separate departments in charge of the different ﬁelds.2
In an important contribution, Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) have pointed out that the different tasks which a principal
delegates to an agent can often be conﬂicting; i.e., one task (e.g., promoting growth or creating jobs) can be directly
detrimental to another task (e.g., protecting the environment or enhancing social security). This may lead the principal to
delegate these tasks to different agents, since it appears to be difﬁcult to motivate one agent to work on two conﬂictingStaatswissenschaftliches Seminar, Albertus-Magnus-Platz, 50923 Ko¨ln, Germany.
hio River spans, the only method allowed under current Kentucky law is the traditional approach,
et, the alternative option of having one contractor in charge of both tasks is also currently discussed,
al Assembly (The Courier-Journal, October 6, 2011). In the case of the Port of Miami Tunnel, a major
st of 1 billion U.S. dollars, it was decided to let the private contractor MAT Concessionaire LLC be in
.
ew South Wales led by Premier Barry O’Farrell, there now is a so-called ‘‘super-ministry’’ led by
Investment and Minister for Regional Infrastructure and Services (The Sydney Morning Herald, April
BY-NC-ND license. 
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Section 6.2.2) show that similar issues can also be fruitfully studied in a complete contracting framework.
Speciﬁcally, Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) assume that the tasks are performed simultaneously and that there is an
effort externality between the tasks, such that effort in one task may reduce the success probability of another task.3 Their
main ﬁnding is that if the conﬂict between the tasks is sufﬁciently strong, then the principal prefers to hire two different
agents to work on the two tasks. In contrast, when the tasks are not conﬂicting, only one agent should be in charge of both
tasks, since it is cheaper for the principal to incentivize one agent (a bonus must only be paid when both tasks are
successful).
In the present paper, we consider tasks that for technological reasons can only be performed sequentially. For instance,
construction of a facility must take place before its operation. In the case of sequential tasks, it is plausible that there may
be an outcome externality between the tasks. When the second task is performed, the outcome of the ﬁrst task is already
realized, and this outcome may affect the success probability of the second task. (If instead an effort externality were
present, then the effort expended on the ﬁrst task – not the outcome – would affect the success probability of the
second task.)
For example, in an infrastructure project, effort may be exerted in an initial phase to come up with an innovative design
that is particularly cheap to build. In the subsequent operation stage, the costs of infrastructure maintenance may
(positively or negatively) depend on the outcome of the ﬁrst stage (i.e., whether or not an innovative facility was built).
Similarly, a principal may want an agent to sell a durable good (say, a tablet computer or a mobile phone) today, but she
may also want an agent to sell the next generation of the device tomorrow. In this case, if a consumer has already bought
the durable good today, then it can be more difﬁcult to sell the next generation product to him tomorrow. Again, it is
plausible that it is the ﬁrst-stage outcome (i.e., whether or not the good was successfully sold) and not the ﬁrst-stage effort
which makes the second-stage task more easy or more difﬁcult.
The main ﬁnding of the present paper is that when there is an outcome externality, then the ﬁndings of Bolton and
Dewatripont (2005) are overturned. If the tasks are in conﬂict, so that a success in the ﬁrst task makes effort in the second
task less effective, then the principal is better off when she hires only one agent in charge of both tasks. In contrast, if there
are synergies between the tasks, then the principal prefers to hire two different agents for the two different tasks. The
intuitive explanation is as follows. In the presence of limited liability, the principal cannot make the agent pay a ﬁne when
there is no success. Hence, the only possibility to motivate an agent to exert unobservable effort is to offer him a bonus
when there is a success, so that the agent enjoys a rent.4 In particular, when effort is not very effective in increasing the
success probability, then the rent that the principal must promise the agent has to be large in order to give him an
incentive to work hard.
Now consider a two-stage model. When exerting effort in the second stage becomes less effective, it becomes more
difﬁcult to motivate the agent in charge of the second stage to work, so that the principal has to increase the rent that she
must leave to the agent when she wants to implement high effort. When the tasks are conﬂicting, an agent who is in
charge in both stages now has an additional incentive to exert effort in the ﬁrst stage, because by making second-stage
effort less effective, he can increase the rent that he can enjoy in the second stage. In contrast, when there are synergies, it
is better for the principal to hire two different agents, because a single agent would now be tempted to shirk in the ﬁrst
stage (and thus make second-stage effort less effective) in order to increase his second-stage rent.
It is important to note that this logic applies only if it is the outcome of the ﬁrst stage that has an impact on the second
stage. Speciﬁcally, we show that when tasks have to be performed sequentially but there is an effort externality instead of
an outcome externality, then the results are qualitatively similar to those obtained by Bolton and Dewatripont (2005).
By now, there is a large contract-theoretic literature on multi-task principal-agent problems in the presence of moral
hazard.5 Early contributions such as Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1991) and Itoh (1994) were based on the trade-off between
incentives and insurance when agents are risk-averse. As has been emphasized by Bolton and Dewatripont (2005, p. 234),
traditional multi-task models were often focused on the effort-substitution problem (an agent who engages in different
activities may have higher/lower effort costs when the tasks are substitutes/complements). In contrast, following Bolton
and Dewatripont (2005), we consider a complete contracting framework with risk-neutral but wealth-constrained agents,6
in which an agent’s effort costs of performing a given task are independent of whether the agent is also in charge of
another task. While many studies in the multi-task agency literature focus on simultaneous tasks, there are by now also
some papers that explore settings in which tasks have to be performed sequentially; see in particular Hirao (1993),
Schmitz (2005), Khalil et al. (2006), Berkovitch et al. (2010), Kra¨kel and Scho¨ttner (2010, 2011), Mu¨ller (2011), and
Ohlendorf and Schmitz (2012). Yet, these contributions do not consider conﬂicting tasks, which are the focus of the present3 As an illustration, consider a principal who wants two goods to be sold. When the goods are imperfect substitutes, then effort to sell one product
may make it more difﬁcult to sell the other product.
4 Laffont and Martimort (2002) use the term ‘‘ limited liability rent’’ to distinguish the rent in moral hazard models with wealth constraints from the
related concept of information rents that a principal has to leave to agents in adverse selection models.
5 For reviews, see Dewatripont et al. (2000), Laffont and Martimort (2002, ch. 5), and Bolton and Dewatripont (2005, ch. 6).
6 Innes (1990), Pitchford (1998), and Tirole (2001) study related ‘‘ efﬁciency wage’’ models in the contract-theoretic sense of Tirole (1999, p. 745) and
Laffont and Martimort (2002, p. 174). See also Kragl and Scho¨ttner (2011), who study whether a principal should hire one or two agents to perform
simultaneous tasks in the presence of wage ﬂoors.
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recently Hoppe and Kusterer (2011) have found evidence supporting Bolton and Dewatripont’s (2005) ﬁndings in a large-
scale laboratory experiment.8
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, a simple model with sequential tasks and outcome
externalities is introduced. Section 3 characterizes the principal’s optimal contract. The case of effort externalities is brieﬂy
discussed in Section 4. Concluding remarks follow in Section 5. All proofs have been relegated to the appendix.2. The model
Consider a principal who wants two sequential tasks to be performed. The veriﬁable outcome of task i 2 f1,2g is
denoted by qi 2 f0,1g: If task i is a success (qi ¼ 1), the principal obtains a revenue R, otherwise her revenue in stage i is
zero. The principal can either employ a single agent to perform both tasks, or she can employ two different agents for the
two different tasks. All parties are risk neutral. An agent has no wealth and his reservation utility is zero.9 Effort on task
i 2 f1,2g is denoted by ei 2 f0,1g: An agent who exerts effort ei incurs a disutility of effort cei. The effort levels are not
observable.
The probability that the ﬁrst task is a success is given by Prfq1 ¼ 1g ¼ aþre1. The probability that the second task is a
success is given by Prfq2 ¼ 1g ¼ aþgq1e2: Throughout, we assume that the parameters a,r,g0,g1 are strictly positive and
ao1maxfr,g0,g1g, so that the expressions that describe probabilities lie between zero and one. Observe that even if the
agent shirks, there is a success with probability a40.10 Moreover, it may depend on the outcome of the ﬁrst stage (q1)
how effective effort in the second stage is. Speciﬁcally, note that the two tasks are technologically independent if g1 ¼ g0:
We say that the two tasks are conﬂicting if g1og0. In this case, a success in the ﬁrst stage makes effort in the second stage
less effective (i.e., there is a negative outcome externality). In contrast, we say that the tasks are synergistic if g14g0. In this
case, a success in the ﬁrst stage makes effort in the second stage more effective (i.e.,there is a positive outcome
externality).
Note that since the two agents are identical, in a ﬁrst-best world (i.e., if effort were contractible) it would make no
difference whether the principal hires one or two agents. Following Bolton and Dewatripont (2005), we assume
throughout that the principal’s revenue R is sufﬁciently large so that she always wants to implement high effort. Hence,
we can focus on the question whether the principal’s expected costs are smaller when she hires one or two agents. To
induce an agent to exert effort, the principal can offer him a wage scheme wq1q2 :¼ wðq1,q2ÞZ0 that is contingent on the
outcomes of both tasks.3. The main results
Suppose ﬁrst that the principal has hired only one agent to perform both tasks. Since effort is unobservable, the
principal must ensure that it is in the agent’s self-interest to choose high effort. Hence, the agent’s expected utility when
he exerts high effort (incurring effort costs c) must be larger than his expected utility when he shirks. The incentive
compatibility constraints ensuring that the agent exerts high effort in the second stage are
ðaþg1Þw11þð1ag1Þw10cZaw11þð1aÞw10
for the case that the ﬁrst stage was a success (q1 ¼ 1) and
ðaþg0Þw01þð1ag0Þw00cZaw01þð1aÞw007 Moreover, each paper also differs in other respects from the present model. For instance, in Hirao (1993) and Berkovitch et al. (2010), a project is
selected in the ﬁrst stage, while unobservable effort is exerted in the second stage only. In Schmitz (2005), no rent can be earned in the ﬁrst stage and
when high effort is always to be implemented, the principal would never hire one agent in charge of both stages. In Ohlendorf and Schmitz (2012) and
Mu¨ller (2011), the second-stage technology is independent of the ﬁrst stage (see also Nieken and Schmitz, 2012, for a related laboratory experiment).
Kra¨kel and Scho¨ttner (2010) analyze an incomplete contracting model with short-term contracts, while in Kra¨kel and Scho¨ttner (2011) there are always
two agents hired in the ﬁrst stage. Khalil et al. (2006) assume that there is an adverse selection problem in the second stage.
8 In Hoppe and Kusterer’s (2011) experiment, the agents were salespersons who could promote one or two products. When the products were
substitutes, so that the tasks are conﬂicting in the sense of Bolton and Dewatripont (2005), high effort levels were observed signiﬁcantly less often when
there was one agent in charge of both tasks compared to the case of two agents. In the absence of conﬂict, the principal was better off when she hired just
one agent, as predicted by Bolton and Dewatripont (2005).
9 Notice that if the agents were not protected by limited liability, the principal could always attain the ﬁrst-best solution by making an agent residual
claimant; i.e., the principal would simply leave her revenue to the agent in exchange for a suitable up-front payment, so that the expected payoff of the
agent would be zero.
10 Note that the ﬁrst-best solution could always be attained if a were equal to zero, because then in case of a success the principal knew for sure that
the agent has exerted high effort. The principal would then just reimburse the agent for his effort costs, so that the agent would make zero expected
proﬁt. In contrast, if a is strictly positive, there can also be a success when the agent shirks. Hence, the principal must leave a rent to the agent, because if
the principal just offered to reimburse the agent’s effort costs, the agent would get zero in expectation if he exerts effort, while he would get a positive
rent if he shirks.
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incentive compatibility constraint
ðaþrÞ½ðaþg1Þw11þð1ag1Þw10cþð1arÞ½ðaþg0Þw01þð1ag0Þw00cc
Za½ðaþg1Þw11þð1ag1Þw10cþð1aÞ½ðaþg0Þw01þð1ag0Þw00c
is satisﬁed.
The principal’s problem is to ﬁnd a wage scheme ðw00,w10,w01,w11Þ in order to minimize her expected costs
ðaþrÞ½ðaþg1Þw11þð1ag1Þw10þð1arÞ½ðaþg0Þw01þð1ag0Þw00
subject to the incentive compatibility constraints and the limited liability constraints wq1q2Z0. Since the agent always has
the possibility to choose low effort without incurring any costs, incentive compatibility and limited liability together imply
that the agent’s participation constraint is always satisﬁed.
Lemma 1. Suppose the principal has delegated both tasks to one agent.(i)1
to bIf g0g1þðg1g0ÞarZ0, it is optimal for the principal to offer the contract w00 ¼w10 ¼ 0, w01 ¼c=g0, and
w11 ¼c
g0þrðaþg0Þ
rg0ðaþg1Þ
:
Then her expected costs are
aþr
r þ
aþg0
g0
 
c:(ii) If g0g1þðg1g0Þaro0, the principal will offer the contract w00 ¼w10 ¼ 0, w01 ¼c=g0, and w11 ¼c=g1: Then her expected
costs are
ðaþrÞaþg1g1
þð1arÞaþg0g0
 
c:Proof. See the Appendix.
Observe that it is optimal for the principal not to make a payment to the agent when the second stage was not
successful, regardless of the outcome of the ﬁrst stage (w00 ¼w10 ¼ 0). Clearly, the principal does not want to reward the
agent for a failure. However, a second-stage success is rewarded even if the ﬁrst stage was a failure (w0140). This is
necessary in order to induce the agent to work hard in the second stage, even when he was not successful in the ﬁrst stage
(the second-stage incentive compatibility constraint conditional on a ﬁrst-stage failure is always binding). With regard to
the bonus w11 that is paid when both stages are successful, a case distinction has to be made.
11 Case (i) always applies if
the tasks are synergistic (g14g0), and it also applies if a conﬂict between the tasks is not too strong. It turns out that the
second-stage incentive compatibility constraint conditional on a ﬁrst-stage success then is not binding; i.e., the wage
scheme that motivates the agent to work hard in the ﬁrst stage is sufﬁcient to also motivate him to work hard in the
second stage after a ﬁrst-stage success. If the conﬂict is very strong, g1g0 may be so negative that we are in case (ii).
In this case, it is very difﬁcult to motivate the agent to work hard in the second stage following a ﬁrst-stage success, so that
the corresponding incentive compatibility constraint then is binding.
Suppose now that the principal has hired two different agents for the two different tasks. Let agent A be in charge of
task 1, while agent B is responsible for task 2. The incentive compatibility constraint ensuring that agent A chooses high
effort in the ﬁrst stage (given that agent B will be induced to exert high effort in the second stage) reads
ðaþrÞ½ðaþg1ÞwA11þð1ag1ÞwA10þð1arÞ½ðaþg0ÞwA01þð1ag0ÞwA00c
Za½ðaþg1ÞwA11þð1ag1ÞwA10þð1aÞ½ðaþg0ÞwA01þð1ag0ÞwA00:
The incentive compatibility constraints that ensure that agent B chooses high effort in the second stage are
ðaþg1ÞwB11þð1ag1ÞwB10cZawB11þð1aÞwB10
for the case that the ﬁrst stage was a success and
ðaþg0ÞwB01þð1ag0ÞwB00cZawB01þð1aÞwB00
for the case that the ﬁrst stage was a failure.1 Note that the assumptions that we made (to ensure that all expressions describing probabilities lie between zero and one) allow g0g1þðg1g0Þar
e positive or negative.
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ðaþrÞ½ðaþg1ÞðwA11þwB11Þþð1ag1ÞðwA10þwB10Þþð1arÞ½ðaþg0ÞðwA01þwB01Þþð1ag0ÞðwA00þwB00Þ
subject to the incentive compatibility constraints and the limited liability constraints wAq1q2Z0 and w
B
q1q2
Z0. Note that
these constraints again imply that the participation constraints are satisﬁed.
Lemma 2. Suppose the principal has hired two different agents to work on the two different tasks. It is optimal for the principal
to offer the contracts wA11 ¼wA10 ¼c=r, wA01 ¼wA00 ¼ 0 and wB11 ¼c=g1, wB01 ¼c=g0, wB10 ¼wB00 ¼ 0. Then the principal’s
expected costs are
ðaþrÞ 1r þ
aþg1
g1
þð1arÞaþg0g0
 
c:
Proof. See the Appendix.
Observe that agent A is rewarded whenever the ﬁrst stage is successful (wA11 ¼wA1040) and agent B is rewarded
whenever the second stage is successful (wB1140, w
B
0140), while the other wages are zero. All incentive compatibility
constraints are binding. Note that the reward that agent B gets after a ﬁrst-stage success (wB11 ¼c=g1) is larger than the
reward he gets after a ﬁrst-stage failure (wB01 ¼c=g0) whenever the tasks are conﬂicting (g1og0), and vice versa if the
tasks are synergistic.
We can now compare the principal’s expected costs that we have derived in Lemmas 1 and 2 in order to determine
when the principal is better off hiring one agent or two agents. Our main result can be stated as follows.
Proposition 1. Consider the case of output externalities.(i) If the two tasks are conﬂicting (g1og0), then the principal prefers to hire one agent who is in charge of both tasks.
(ii) If the two tasks are synergistic (g14g0), then the principal prefers to hire two different agents for the two different tasks.
(iii) If the two tasks are independent (g1 ¼ g0), then the principal is indifferent between hiring one or two agents.Proof. See the Appendix.
Intuitively, consider the case of conﬂicting tasks, so that a success in the ﬁrst stage implies that it becomes more
difﬁcult to be successful in the second task. Hence, when the outcome of the ﬁrst stage was a success, then the agent in
charge of the second stage must get a larger rent in order to motivate him to exert high second-stage effort. For this reason,
if the same agent is in charge of both stages, there is an additional incentive for him to exert high effort in the ﬁrst stage
(since high ﬁrst-stage effort increases the probability that he will get a larger rent in the second stage). In contrast,
consider the case of synergistic tasks. If the outcome of the ﬁrst stage was a success, then the principal has to pay only a
relatively small rent to the agent in charge of the second stage in order to induce high second-stage effort. If the same
agent were in charge of both stages, it would thus be more difﬁcult to motivate him to work hard in the ﬁrst stage (since
by shirking in the ﬁrst stage he can increase the probability that he will get a larger rent in the second stage).
4. Effort externalities
We now brieﬂy consider a model in which the tasks still have to be performed sequentially, but instead of an outcome
externality as in the main part of the present paper, there is an effort externality as in Bolton and Dewatripont (2005).
Speciﬁcally, consider the following modiﬁcation of our basic model. While the probability of a ﬁrst-stage success is still
given by Prfq1 ¼ 1g ¼ aþre1, the probability of a second-stage success is now given by Prfq2 ¼ 1g ¼ aþre2ge1, regardless
of the ﬁrst-stage outcome. Hence, the tasks are now conﬂicting if g40, while they are synergistic if go0. In line with
Bolton and Dewatripont (2005), we assume that in the second stage the effect of ﬁrst-stage effort is smaller than the effect
of second-stage effort, g
 or, and that maxfg,0goao1rþminfg,0g, so that the expressions describing probabilities lie
between zero and one.
Suppose the principal has hired one agent. The principal’s problem is to ﬁnd non-negative wages ðw00,w10,w01,w11Þ that
minimize her expected costs
ðaþrÞ½ðaþrgÞw11þð1arþgÞw10þð1arÞ½ðaþrgÞw01þð1arþgÞw00:
The second-stage incentive compatibility constraints are rðw11w10ÞZc for the case that the ﬁrst stage was a success and
rðw01w00ÞZc for the case that the ﬁrst stage was a failure. The agent is willing to exert high effort in the ﬁrst stage if the
incentive compatibility constraint
ðaþrÞ½ðaþrgÞw11þð1arþgÞw10cþð1arÞ½ðaþrgÞw01þð1arþgÞw00cc
Za½ðaþrÞw11þð1arÞw10cþð1aÞ½ðaþrÞw01þð1arÞw00c
is satisﬁed. Hence, the following result must hold.
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high
outcIf gr0, it is optimal for the principal to offer the contract w00 ¼w10 ¼ 0, w01 ¼c=r, and
w11 ¼
rþðaþrÞðrgÞþg
aþr  rg r c:
Then her expected costs are 2½1þa=ðrgÞc.(ii) If g40, the principal will offer the contract w00 ¼ 0, w10 ¼ ðgþrÞc=r2, w01 ¼c=r, and w11 ¼ ðgþ2rÞc=r2. Then her
expected costs are ½2þð2rþgÞa=r2c.Proof. See the Appendix.
Note that in the case of synergistic tasks, the agent does not get a reward if the second task fails. In contrast, in the case
of conﬂicting tasks, when there was a ﬁrst-stage success the agent even gets a reward if the second task is a failure.
Intuitively, in the case of conﬂict, a failure in the second stage is indicative of high effort in the ﬁrst stage. Moreover, note
that the principal must always pay a positive wage when there is a second-stage success even when the ﬁrst stage was a
failure, because otherwise the agent would shirk in the second stage if the ﬁrst stage was not successful.12
Suppose now that the principal has hired two different agents, so that agent A is in charge of task 1 and agent B is in
charge of task 2. The principal designs non-negative wages ðwA00,wA10,wA01,wA11Þ and ðwB00,wB10,wB01,wB11Þ in order to minimize
her expected costs
ðaþrÞ½ðaþrgÞðwA11þwB11Þþð1arþgÞðwA10þwB10Þþð1arÞ½ðaþrgÞðwA01þwB01Þþð1arþgÞðwA00þwB00Þ:
The incentive compatibility constraint ensuring that agent A chooses high effort in the ﬁrst stage (given that agent B will
be induced to exert high effort in the second stage) can be written as
ðaþrÞðrgÞwA11þðð1arÞrþgðaþrÞÞwA10ððaþrÞðrgÞþgÞwA01ð1arÞðrgÞwA00Zc:
The incentive compatibility constraints which ensure that agent B chooses high effort in the second stage are
rðwB11wB10ÞZc and rðwB01wB00ÞZc: Thus, we obtain the following result.
Lemma 4. Consider effort externalities and suppose the principal has hired two different agents to work on the two different
tasks. The principal sets wB00 ¼wB10 ¼ 0 and wB11 ¼wB01 ¼c=r.(i) If gr0, it is optimal for the principal to set wA00 ¼wA01 ¼wA10 ¼ 0, and wA11 ¼c=½ðaþrÞðrgÞ: Then her expected costs are
ð2rgÞðaþrgÞ
ðrgÞr c:(ii) If g40, the principal will set wA00 ¼wA01 ¼wA11 ¼ 0, and wA10 ¼c=½ð1arÞrþgðaþrÞ: Then her expected costs are 
aþrg
r
þ ð1arþgÞðaþrÞð1arÞrþðaþrÞg c:Proof. See the Appendix.
Observe that agent B must get a reward for a second-stage success regardless of the outcome of the ﬁrst stage to
motivate him to always exert high effort. However, in the case of synergistic tasks, agent A gets a reward only if both tasks
are successful, while in the case of conﬂicting tasks, agent A gets a reward only if task 1 is a success and task 2 is a failure
(since in the latter case a failure of task 2 is indicative of high effort in task 1).
Proposition 2. Consider the case of effort externalities.(i)2
oIf the two tasks are conﬂicting (g40), then the principal prefers to hire two different agents for the two different tasks.
(ii) If the two tasks are synergistic (go0), then the principal prefers to hire one agent who is in charge of both tasks.
(iii) If the two tasks are independent (g¼ 0), then the principal is indifferent between hiring one or two agents.Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 2 shows that in a model with effort externalities, the insights of Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) and Bolton
and Dewatripont (2005) are qualitatively robust also when the tasks are performed sequentially. The principal prefers toNotice that this observation is different from the simultaneous choice setting in Bolton and Dewatripont (2005), in which it is possible to induce
efforts in both tasks by paying a positive wage if and only if both tasks are successful. This is not possible in our model, where the ﬁrst-stage
me is known when the second-stage effort level is chosen.
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when this reduces the success probability of the other task.13 Speciﬁcally, a success in task 2 may indicate that the agent
worked hard in the second stage, but it might also indicate that he shirked in the ﬁrst stage. In contrast, in the model with
outcome externalities analyzed in the main part of the paper, given the ﬁrst-stage outcome, the outcome of stage 2 could
not be indicative of the effort level chosen in stage 1. Taken together, when a principal has to decide whether to delegate
two sequential tasks to one agent or to two agents, it is of crucial importance whether the second stage is inﬂuenced by the
ﬁrst-stage effort or by the ﬁrst-stage outcome.
5. Concluding remarks
When a principal wants to induce high efforts in two sequential tasks, then for incentive reasons she may be better off
hiring one agent if the tasks are in conﬂict, while she may prefer to hire two different agents if there are synergies between
the tasks. This result holds when there is an outcome externality; i.e., when the outcome of the ﬁrst stage can make it more
or less difﬁcult to be successful in the second stage. In contrast, when there is an effort externality, so that ﬁrst-stage effort
has a direct impact on the second-stage success probability, then the opposite result holds.
Several avenues for future research seem to be promising. The model was kept as simple as possible to highlight the
effects in a clear way. In future work, the model could be extended to cover also adverse selection aspects, where agents
have private information about their types.14 The interaction of limited liability rents and information rents can be
complicated (see Laffont and Martimort, 2002), but might lead to interesting new insights. Moreover, since the model is
very simple, it might be useful as a building block in more applied work. For instance, the ﬁrst and second stages could
correspond to different levels of a supply chain, so that when the same decision-maker is in charge of both stages, there
would be vertical integration according to the traditional deﬁnition in the industrial organization literature.15 Moreover,
the question whether or not there should be term limits for politicians (cf. Besley and Case, 1995) is closely related to the
question whether or not the same agent should be in charge of sequential tasks. Furthermore, starting with Hart (2003)
and Bennett and Iossa (2006), several authors have recently pointed out that an important characteristic of the so-called
public–private partnerships is that the two stages of building and subsequently managing a public facility are delegated to
one agent (a consortium), while under traditional procurement the two sequential tasks of building and managing are
delegated to two different contractors. While the relevance of both positive and negative externalities between the stages
is also a common theme in this applied literature,16 the effects of conﬂicting tasks in a moral hazard framework as
analyzed in the present paper have not yet been considered there. Integrating these kinds of externalities might lead to
interesting novel insights.Acknowledgments
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AppendixProof of Lemma 1. Note that the incentive compatibility constraints can be rewritten such that they read
g1ðw11w10ÞZc and g0ðw01w00ÞZc in the second stage, and
r½ðaþg1Þw11þð1ag1Þw10ðaþg0Þw01ð1ag0Þw00Zc
in the ﬁrst stage. Observe ﬁrst that w00 ¼ 0 must hold in the solution to the principal’s problem.17 Hence, the incentive
compatibility constraint for the second stage after a ﬁrst-stage failure now reads g0w01Zc. Note that in the optimum this13 Note that in the simultaneous setting of Bolton and Dewatripont (2005), the principal prefers to hire two agents only if the conﬂict between the
tasks is sufﬁciently strong, while she strictly prefers to hire one agent when the tasks are independent. In contrast, in the sequential model the principal
prefers two agents whenever the tasks are conﬂicting. The reason is that as has been pointed out in footnote 12, in the simultaneous setting the principal
can save rents by hiring one agent and paying him a positive wage if and only if both tasks are successful, which does not work in the sequential setting.
As a consequence, hiring one agent has an additional advantage in the simultaneous setting.
14 Models analyzing task assignment and job design from an adverse selection perspective include Riordan and Sappington (1987), Dana (1993),
Gilbert and Riordan (1995), and Lewis and Sappington (1997).
15 See Tirole (1988, ch. 4) and cf. Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990), and Hart (1995) for an incomplete contracting perspective on
vertical integration.
16 See Martimort and Pouyet (2008), Chen and Chiu (2010, 2011), De Brux and Desrieux (2011), Iossa and Martimort (2012), Hoppe and Schmitz
(forthcoming), and Martimort and Straub (2012). See also the related theoretical studies on privatization by Hart et al. (1997) and Hoppe and Schmitz
(2010).
17 To see this, assume that in the solution w0040 would hold. Then the principal’s expected proﬁt could be increased by reducing w00 without
violating any constraints, contradicting the optimality of w0040.
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r½w10þðaþg1Þðw11w10Þðaþg0Þc=g0Zc:
(i) Ignore for a moment the second-stage incentive compatibility constraint conditional on a ﬁrst-stage success,
g1ðw11w10ÞZc. Then the binding ﬁrst-stage incentive compatibility constraint implies
w11 ¼w10þ
c=rþðaþg0Þc=g0w10
aþg1
:
The omitted constraint g1ðw11w10ÞZc is thus satisﬁed whenever
w10r
g0g1þðg1g0Þar
rg0g1
c:
Hence, we have found the solution in the case g0g1þðg1g0ÞarZ0. Note that the principal has some freedom in choosing
w11 and w10 when g0g1þðg1g0Þar40, since there are multiple combinations of these two wages leading to the (uniquely
determined) minimal expected costs ½ðaþrÞ=rþðaþg0Þ=g0c. Speciﬁcally, the principal can always set w10 ¼ 0 and
w11 ¼c
g0þrðaþg0Þ
rg0ðaþg1Þ
as stated in the lemma.
(ii) Next consider the case g0g1þðg1g0Þaro0, so that the constraint g1ðw11w10ÞZc must be binding. Hence,
w11 ¼c=g1þw10. The ﬁrst-stage incentive compatibility constraint is then satisﬁed whenever
w10Zc
1
r
aþg1
g1
þ aþg0g0
 
:
The right-hand side of this constraint is negative, since g0g1þðg1g0Þaro0. Thus, the condition is always satisﬁed when
the principal sets w10 as small as possible, w10 ¼ 0. Therefore, if g0g1þðg1g0Þaro0, the principal sets w11 ¼c=g1 and her
expected costs are given by
ðaþrÞaþg1g1
þð1arÞaþg0g0
 
c: &
Proof of Lemma 2. It is easy to see that agent A’s incentive compatibility constraint can be simpliﬁed to
r½ðaþg1ÞwA11þð1ag1ÞwA10ðaþg0ÞwA01ð1ag0ÞwA00Zc:
Moreover, agent B’s incentive compatibility constraints can be rewritten as g1ðwB11wB10ÞZc and g0ðwB01wB00ÞZc. Hence,
the principal will set wB00 ¼wB10 ¼ 0, so that the binding constraints imply wB11 ¼c=g1 and wB01 ¼c=g0.
With regard to agent A, the principal has to set wA00 ¼wA01 ¼ 0 in order to minimize her expected costs. The principal has
some freedom in designing the wages wA11 and w
A
10. All combinations of w
A
11 and w
A
10 that satisfy agent A’s binding incentive
compatibility constraint
ðaþg1ÞwA11þð1ag1ÞwA10 ¼c=r
minimize the principal’s expected costs. Speciﬁcally, it seems to make sense not to condition agent A’s wages on the
outcome of the second stage, wA11 ¼wA10 ¼c=r. In any case, the principal’s expected costs are uniquely determined; they
are given by
ðaþrÞ 1
r
þ aþg1
g1
þð1arÞaþg0
g0
 
c: &
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider ﬁrst the case g0g1þðg1g0ÞarZ0. Inspection of Lemmas 1 and 2 immediately reveals
that the principal prefers to hire only one agent in charge of both tasks whenever
aþr
r þ
aþg0
g0
 
cr ðaþrÞ 1r þ
aþg1
g1
þð1arÞaþg0g0
 
c,
which is equivalent to
ðaþg0Þg1rðaþrÞðaþg1Þg0þð1arÞðaþg0Þg1
and which can be further simpliﬁed to g1rg0. Hence, the principal prefers to hire one agent (two agents) whenever the
two tasks are conﬂicting (synergistic).
Next, consider the case g0g1þðg1g0Þaro0. Note that this case can occur only if the tasks are conﬂicting (g1og0).
In this case, it follows from Lemmas 1 and 2 that the principal prefers to hire only one agent in charge of both tasks whenever
ðaþrÞaþg1g1
þð1arÞaþg0g0
 
cr ðaþrÞ 1r þ
aþg1
g1
þð1arÞaþg0g0
 
c:
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immediately. &
Proof of Lemma 3. It is straightforward to see that the principal will set w00 ¼ 0. Hence, she minimizes
ðaþrÞ½ðaþrgÞw11þð1arþgÞw10þð1arÞðaþrgÞw01
subject to the second-stage incentive compatibility constraints rðw11w10ÞZc and rw01Zc, the ﬁrst-stage incentive
compatibility constraint
ðaþrÞðrgÞw11þ½ð1arÞrþgðaþrÞw10½ðaþrÞðrgÞþgw01Zc,
and the limited liability constraints. It is easy to verify that it is optimal for the principal to set w01 ¼c=r.
Suppose that
ð1arÞrþgðaþrÞr0
so that go0. Then the principal sets w10 ¼ 0, so that the ﬁrst-stage incentive compatibility constraint is binding and thus
w11 ¼
rþðaþrÞðrgÞþg
ðaþrÞðrgÞr c:
In this case, the constraint rðw11w10ÞZc is non-binding and the principal’s expected costs are 2½1þa=ðrgÞc. Now
suppose that
ð1arÞrþgðaþrÞ40:
Note that if in the solution w1040, then all incentive compatibility constraints must be binding, so that w10 ¼ gþr
 
c=r2
and w11 ¼ gþ2r
 
c=r2, and the principal’s expected costs are ½2þð2rþgÞa=r2c. The latter expression is smaller than
2½1þa=ðrgÞc whenever g is positive. The lemma then follows immediately. &
Proof of Lemma 4. Observe that it is optimal for the principal to set wA00 ¼wA01 ¼wB00 ¼wB10 ¼ 0 and wB11 ¼wB01 ¼c=r:
Agent A’s incentive compatibility constraint reads
ðaþrÞðrgÞwA11þðð1arÞrþgðaþrÞÞwA10Zc:
Suppose
ð1arÞrþgðaþrÞr0
so that go0. Then the principal sets wA10 ¼ 0 and thus wA11 ¼c=½ðaþrÞðrgÞ. Next, suppose
ð1arÞrþgðaþrÞ40:
It is straightforward to check that the principal will then set wA11 ¼ 0 and wA10 ¼c=½ð1arÞrþgðaþrÞ if g is positive,
while she sets wA10 ¼ 0 and thus wA11 ¼c=½ðaþrÞðrgÞ if g is negative. The lemma follows immediately. &
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) Suppose g40. The principal’s expected costs if she hires one agent are
K1 :¼ ½2þð2rþgÞa=r2c, while her expected costs if she hires two agents are
K2 :¼
aþrg
r þ
ð1arþgÞðaþrÞ
ð1arÞrþðaþrÞg
 
c:
It is straightforward to check that
K1 ¼
2r2þð2rþgÞa
r2
c
and
K2 ¼
ðaþrgÞ½ð1arÞrþðaþrÞgþð1arþgÞðaþrÞr
r½ð1arÞrþðaþrÞg c:
Hence, the difference in expected costs is
K1K2 ¼ g
c
r2
ðaþrÞ ð1rÞrþðaþrÞgð1raÞrþðaþrÞg ,
which under our assumptions is strictly positive.
(ii) Suppose go0. The principal’s expected costs if she hires one agent are K1 :¼ 2½1þa=ðrgÞc, while her expected
costs if she hires two agents are
K2 :¼
ð2rgÞðaþrgÞ
ðrgÞr c:
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K2K1 ¼g
c
rðrgÞ ðagþrÞ,
which under our assumptions is strictly positive.
(iii) Suppose g¼ 0. Then the principal’s expected costs are 2cðaþrÞ=r, regardless of whether she hires one or two
agents. &
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